Introduction
In his response to the evidential problem of evil, Stephen Wykstra takes the position of a skeptical theist and argues against the likelihood of the existence of pointless evils by using the good-parent analogy. William Rowe, however, points out the disanalogy between God and a parent by appealing to the issue of divine silence (Rowe, 2007).
In this essay, I shall attempt to demonstrate that it is still rational to hold theistic beliefs in the face of divine silence. We will begin our discussion with a brief outline of Wykstra’s position and Rowe’s response. Following that, we will critically examine the works of two prominent philosophers who have written on the issue of divine silence, namely, John Schellenberg’s argument for atheism and Michael Murray’s argument for theism. It would be important to note that the term ‘God’, as it is used in this paper, refers to the theistic conception of God.
Wykstra’s Skeptical Theism
In his discussion of the evidential problem of evil, Rowe argues that while the reality of evil in our world and the notion of God’s existence may not lead to a logical contradiction, the presence of evil nonetheless provides rational support for atheism (Rowe, 2007). To understand his argument, we first need to distinguish between justified evils and pointless evils. By justified evils, we mean evils that God, assuming that he exists, permits so as to bring about a greater good. Pointless evils, on the other hands, are evils which serve no higher purpose. Rowe’s example of the suffering fawn can be perceived as an example of a pointless evil. Given the plethora of evils in our world, Rowe suggests that it is likely that there are pointless evils. However, if God exists, there should be no pointless evils. Therefore, he concludes that God does not exist (Rowe, 2007, p. 120).
Wykstra responds to Rowe’s line of reasoning by pointing out that the first premise, that it is like that there are pointless evils, may not be true. He argues that given the huge epistemic gap between our knowledge and God’s omniscience, it is no surprise that we cannot perceive the greater goods God purposed in the evils he permitted. In Wykstra’s own words, we have not met ‘the condition of reasonable epistemic access’ or ‘CORNEA’ as he calls it (Wykstra, 1984, p. 152). Wykstra further clarifies his point by drawing an analogy, likening humanity to a one-month-old infant whose parent is God.
Rowe objects, however, to Wykstra’s analogy by calling our attention to the fact that parents usually try all means to comfort their children by giving them assurances of their love (Rowe, 2007). God, however, appears to be awfully silent when humanity suffers. Rowe further suggests that given the immense amount of evil in the world, God’s silence seem to provide rational grounds to conclude his nonexistence.
Schellenberg’s Argument for Atheism
A more thorough examination of the issue of divine silence and its relation to the nonexistence of God has been put forward by John Schellenberg. In this part of the essay, I shall attempt to summarize Schellenberg’s argument and critically examine it.
Like Wykstra, Schellenberg uses the analogy of a parent and child to draw comparisons with humanity’s relationship with God. More specifically, he suggests that the state of humanity is like a lost child, in a vast and dangerous place, calling out for his mother to no avail (Schellenberg, 2004). Schellenberg surmises that there are only two plausible reasons for the mother’s non response. It could either be that the mother doesn’t love the child, or that it is beyond the power of the mother to respond to the child. The theistic concept of God, however, holds that God possesses the characteristics of omnibenevolence and omnipotence. Given these characteristics, it seems that God, if he exists, would not hide himself given the dire state of humanity. However, since divine silence does in fact occur, it provides rational support for atheism.
Critically examining Schellenberg’s argument, one realises that two objections can be raised against it. Firstly, a theist might object by saying that although it is granted that God is silent now, we do not know for sure that he will continue to be silent in the future (Peterson & Vanarragon, 2004). In fact, many theistic traditions have in them eschatological notions. For instance, the Jews believe in the coming of a Messiah, the Christians believe that Jesus is returning to this world, and the Muslims await the return of Prophet Muhammad (Schmidt, Sager, Carney, Julius J. Jackson, Muller, & Zanca, 2005). This is, in my opinion, the weaker objection because Schellenberg can retort by saying that since divine silence is only going to broken in the future, he is still rationally justified in holding his atheist position today.
The second objection raised against Schellenberg’s argument for atheism resembles Wykstra’s objection to Rowe’s evidential problem of evil. A theist might object by saying that the hidden assumption in Schellenberg’s argument, that God would give a prompt response to everyone who calls on him, appears to be an unjustified one (Peterson & Vanarragon, 2004). In his omniscience, God may have purposed divine silence for a greater good that is not conceivable to a human mother due to our limited cognitive capacities. For instance, a reason for withholding a response might be to transform the character of the devotee into one which longs more for God. This objection is rather similar to Wykstra’s skeptical theistic position.
However, apart from presenting the argument for atheism cogently, Schellenberg also raises an interesting point in which he challenges Wykstra’s skeptical theistic position and the second objection we raised directly. He asks, since theists claim that the greatest good any human being can experience is in believing God and having an appropriate relationship with him, “Why this talk of some other good, for which God would sacrifice such relationship?” (Schellenberg, 2004, p. 37). To answer Schellenberg’s question, we turn to the last segment of our essay, Michael Murray’s argument for theism.
Murray’s Argument for Theism
Although there are many ways in which a theist can defend the rationality of his beliefs in the face of divine silence, this paper adopts Michael Murray’s argument because it explicitly addresses the question Schellenberg raises. Other arguments for the compatibility of theism and divine silence, which include the human defectiveness theories and theories of divine transcendence, are beyond the scope of this paper (McKim, 1990) (Keller, 1995).
To make plain how Schellenberg’s question leads to the conclusion that God does not exist, we can restate it in the form of an argument.
1. If belief in God and having an appropriate relationship with him is the greatest good any human being can experience, it would expected that God would provide unmistakable evidences for his existence.
2. However, such evidence is not readily available.
Therefore,
3. Probably, God does not exist.
Having an appropriate relationship with God refers to the elements of spirituality typically assumed by theists. Examples include trusting in God, being committed to him, loving him and wanting to do his will.
Since divine silence is a reality that most theists would not contend against, we shall not attempt to reject premise 2. Instead, we shall attempt to demonstrate that although belief in God and having an appropriate relationship with him may arguably be the greatest good any human being can experience, it does not follow that God would necessarily provide unmistakable evidences for his existence.
This is because, while unmistakable evidences for his existence would aid humanity’s belief in and relationship with God, they become unmeaningful under those circumstances. They are unmeaningful because humanity would be coerced into them; we cannot choose to do otherwise under those conditions.
To better understand the relation between coercion and divine silence, we need to look at Michael Murray's concept of a 'significant threat'. Coercion occurs only when there is a significant threat, and to determine if the threat is significant, we need to look at certain factors. Murray’s proposed factors include the strength of the threat, the probability of occurrence of the threat, and the knowledge of the threat (Murray, 1999).
Since the threat of hell is arguably the strongest threat anyone can face, and since the probability of that occurring to a non-believer is absolute, Murray argues that the only way to prevent coercion from occurring is to reduce humanity's knowledge of the threat, which is divine silence (Murray, 1999).
Thus, to answer Schellenberg’s question directly, God would sacrifice a relationship with humanity because a coerced one is unmeaningful and it would not be the greatest good humanity can experience. Humanity would lose her freedom if divine silence is broken.
Before concluding, it would be good to note that although Murray’s reasoning seems sound, it does not account for non usage of other threat reducing methods. For instance, God could choose to eliminate the threat of hell. In this way, the strength of the threat would be greatly reduced and divine silence would be unnecessary.
Conclusion
Although Rowe may be justified in pointing out the disanalogy between a good parent and God by referring to divine silence, he could have presented a more balanced view by mentioning that the argument for atheism from divine silence is not without its problems, and that theists may have valid explanations for the occurrence of divine silence. Thus, a theist may still be rationally justified in holding on to his beliefs, in spite of divine silence.
Works Cited
Keller, J. A. (1995). The Hiddenness of God and the Problem of Evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 12-24.
McKim, R. (1990). The Hiddenness of God. Religious Studies , 141-161.
Murray, M. (1999). Coercion and the hiddenness of God. In E. Stump, & M. Murray, Philosophy of religion: the big questions (pp. 241-249). Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Peterson, M. L., & Vanarragon, R. J. (2004). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
Rowe, W. (2007). Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction. Belmont: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2004). Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism. In M. Peterson, & R. Vanarragon, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (pp. 30-41). Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Schmidt, R., Sager, G. C., Carney, G. T., Julius J. Jackson, J., Muller, A. C., & Zanca, K. J. (2005). Patterns of Religion. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.
Stump, E., & Murray, M. J. (1999). Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Wykstra, S. J. (1984). The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of 'Appearance'. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 73-93.
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